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INNOVATIVE FINANCING AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM GLOBAL HEALTH 
 
David Gartner
†
 
 
Abstract: The growth of innovative financing for development over the last 
decade has demonstrated the enormous potential of new mechanisms for generating 
resources beyond traditional official development assistance.  In the global health sector, 
diverse innovative finance institutions provide a window into the relative merits of 
approaches that rely on taxation, bonds, and advanced contract arrangements.  The 
experience of IFFIm, UNITAID, and the AMC offer broader insights into the importance 
of sustainability and participation in ensuring the success of innovative finance 
mechanisms, as well as the potential for innovative financing to contribute to realizing 
the Sustainable Development Goals.  The most successful of these innovative 
mechanisms are generally the most automatic in terms of financing and the most 
participatory in terms of governance.  More participatory approaches to designing and 
governing innovative financing seem to foster better outcomes in terms of the ultimate 
market impact of these financing mechanisms. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
The Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”) catalyzed a dramatic 
era of innovation in financing global health and development.  With the 
launch of the Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”) in 2015, the 
challenges of financing will be even greater, and drawing valuable lessons 
from the past decade of experience with innovative financing mechanisms 
will be especially crucial.  Preliminary estimates suggest that achieving the 
SDGs could cost somewhere between USD 2 and USD 3 trillion dollars.
1
  
While much of these resources will come from domestic resource 
mobilization and private financing, some thirty countries around the world 
will likely require substantial development assistance in order to achieve the 
goals.
2
  Innovative financing could be an important enabler of success for a 
much wider range of countries.  Over the last decade, innovative approaches 
                                                     
† Professor of Law at Arizona State University, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law.  J.D. Yale 
Law School, Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.   Thanks to Carlos Cuevas, Philipp Dann, Tim 
Buthe, Amanda Glassman, Benedict Kingsbury, and Anita Ramasastry for all their helpful suggestions and 
comments and to all of the participants in the University of Washington Symposium on the Post-2015 
Development Agenda, the Duke University Workshop in Political Institutions, Behavior, and Identities, and 
the Innovations in Governance of Development Finance Conference at New York University. 
1 See U.N. System Task Team (UNTT), Working Group on Sustainable Development Financing, 
Financing for Sustainable Development: Review of Global Investment Requirements and Estimates 
(2014), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2096Chapter%201global%20investment
%20requirement%20estimates.pdf.     
2  See HOMI KHARAS, ANNALISA PRIZZER & ANDREW ROGERSON, OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT 
INSTITUTE, FINANCING THE POST-2015 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS: A ROUGH ROAD MAP 7 (2014), 
available at http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9374.pdf. 
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to development financing have become increasingly important and much of 
this experimentation has been in the global health sector.  Estimates of the 
scale of innovative finance reveal a tenfold increase in non-traditional flows 
of development assistance, and the World Bank calculates that the flow 
reached a total of USD 57.1 billion between 2000 and 2008.
3
   
Innovative approaches to global health financing offer a unique 
window into the relative merits of mechanisms that rely on taxation, bonds, 
and advanced contracting arrangements.  While these efforts share common 
inspiration in realizing the MDGs, the involvement of a range of different 
state and non-state actors has fostered distinct governance structures and 
approaches.  While most of these mechanisms have generated additional 
resources, some have also created substantial future liabilities.  The more 
participatory examples of these innovative finance mechanisms have 
aggressively sought to reshape relevant markets for essential medicines and 
vaccines while others have undertaken a more limited mandate.   
Innovative finance became a central feature of development debates in 
the wake of the Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development in 
2002, as many G8 countries sought to contribute to achieve the MDGs while 
limiting the overall domestic budgetary cost.  At Monterrey, countries agreed 
“to study, in the appropriate forums, the results of the analysis requested 
from the Secretary General on possible innovative sources of finance.”
4
  At 
the 2005 UN World Summit to review progress on the MDGs, seventy-nine 
countries issued a Declaration on Innovative Sources of Financing, 
reflecting an evolved sophistication of thinking about the issue.
5
  Among 
other developments, the Summit catalyzed the launch of innovative 
financing mechanisms such as UNITAID.
6
  In 2008, the United Nations 
established a High Level Taskforce on Innovative Financing for Health 
Systems to build on the experience of first generation innovative financing 
efforts.
7
  The Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon, 
appointed former French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy as the 
Secretary General’s special advisor on innovative financing for 
                                                     
3 See Navin Girishankar, Innovating Development Finance: From Financing Sources to Financial 
Solutions 8 (Concessional Fin. & Global Partnerships, Working Paper Series No. 1, 2009). 
4 International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mex., Mar. 18-22, 2002, 
Monterrey Consensus, ¶44, U.N. DOC. A/CONF.198/11 (2003). 
5 Elisabeth Sandor, Simon Scott & Julia Benn, Innovative Financing to Fund Development 
Progress and Prospects, OECD DEV. CO-OPERATION DIRECTORATE ISSUES BRIEF 1, 2 (Nov. 2009), 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/44087344.pdf. 
6 John Langmore, Innovative Sources of Development Finance, DEVPOLICY BLOG (Dec. 16, 2011), 
http://devpolicy.org/innovative-sources-of-development-finance20111216/. 
7  See David McCoy & Nouria Brikci, Taskforce on Innovative International Financing for Health 
Systems: What Next?, 88 BULL. OF THE WHO 478 (2010). 
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development.
8
  By 2012, about twenty different countries had established or 
actively participated in at least one innovative financing mechanism.
9 
Amidst dramatic innovation within development finance, a growing 
number of scholars have sought to re-conceptualize the interaction between 
public and private actors and the important role of innovative governance 
within these institutions.
10
  Some scholars have suggested that literature on 
the accountability of international institutions should be applied to analyzing 
the structures of development financing.
11
  Others have pointed out that 
traditionally sharp distinctions between the areas of public and private law 
are not helpful in analyzing the rapidly evolving area of development 
finance.
12
  Hybrid frameworks, which involve public and private actors in 
governance and catalyze both public and private resources, are central to the 
innovative financing mechanisms that have emerged in recent years.   
Scholars focused on the governance of international institutions are 
becoming increasingly interested in the role of non-state actors alongside 
states within these institutions.  Some of this work focuses on the role of 
non-governmental organizations,13 while other work highlights the growing 
role of foundations and corporations, as well as the influence of bureaucrats 
within these institutions.
14
  Amidst growing interest in explaining the causes 
of participation by these diverse stakeholders,
15
 there remains somewhat 
limited analysis of the consequences of such participation.  At the same 
time, scholarly interest in the relationships and interactions between 
different international institutions is growing.  Recent work highlights how 
new institutions challenge existing ones in the context of “contested 
                                                     
8 Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Appoints Philippe Douste-Blazy of 
France as Special Adviser on Innovative Financing for Development, U.N. Press Release SG/A/1119-
BIO/3962-DEV/2659 (February 18, 2008). 
9  Peer Review of Existing Innovative Financings for Development, LEADING GRP. ON INNOVATIVE 
FIN. FOR DEV. (June 12, 2013), http://leadinggroup.org/IMG/pdf/Mapping_FIDENG-3.pdf. 
10  See Kevin Davis, Financing Development as a Field of Practice, Study and Innovation (NYU 
Institute for International Law & Justice, Working Paper no. 2008/2010, 2008). 
11  See Robert Keohane & Ruth Grant, Accountability and Abuses in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 29 (2005) (defining accountability as “the right to hold other actors to a set of standards to judge 
whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities to these standards, and to impose sanctions if they 
determine these responsibilities have not been met”); Philipp Dann, Accountability in Development Aid 
Law: The World Bank, UNDP, and Emerging Structures of Transnational Oversight, 44 ARCHIV DES 
VÖLKERRECHTS 381 (2006). 
12  See Davis, supra note 10. 
13  See David Gartner, Beyond the Monopoly of States, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 595 (2010). 
14  See Tana Johnson & Johannes Urpelainen, International Bureaucrats and the Formation of 
Intergovernmental Organizations: Institutional Design Discretion Sweetens the Pot, 68 INT’L ORG. 177 
(2014). 
15  See Kenneth W. Abbott & David Gartner, Reimagining Participation in International Institutions, 
8 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 1 (2012). 
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multilateralism,”
16
 how international institutions shape action through 
“orchestration,”
17
 and how existing international institutions contribute to 
the birth of new institutions.
18
  Yet relatively few scholars have analyzed the 
symbiotic relationship between the financing and implementing institutions.  
This article examines the causes of institutional variation within the realm of 
innovative global health financing and highlights the significance of 
participation by non-state actors in the governance of these institutions for 
shaping market reform.  
This article examines three different innovative financing mechanisms 
that emerged after 2005: The International Financial Facility for 
Immunizations (“IFFIm”), UNITAID, and the Advanced Market 
Commitment (“AMC”) initiative.  A single G8 country championed each of 
these innovative financing mechanisms and ultimately the entire G8 
endorsed them to accelerate progress toward achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals.  Yet each mechanism relied upon a different financial 
instrument: bonds in the case of IFFIm, taxation in the case of UNITAID, 
and long-term contracts in the case of the AMC.  Despite their common 
inspiration, each utilized different approaches for their initial design and 
adopted distinct governance structures.  These early decisions on the design 
and governance of these financing mechanisms had important implications 
for the evolution and ultimate success of each mechanism.  Part II examines 
the emergence of these three innovative financing mechanisms.  Part III 
analyzes the factors that shaped the design and success of each model.  Part 
IV explores the implications of these mechanisms for efforts to achieve the 
Sustainable Development Goals and analyzes which structures and models 
of innovative financing hold the greatest promise for the future. 
II. INNOVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
A. International Finance Facility for Immunizations 
 
The International Finance Facility for Immunizations was launched in 
2006 by six donor governments as a mechanism to front-load assistance for 
global health.  The original six donors, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, 
Sweden, and Norway, used legally binding commitments of overseas 
development assistance (“ODA”) to issue bonds on international capital 
                                                     
16  See Julie Morse & Robert Keohane, Contested Multilateralism, 9(4) REV. INT’L ORG. 385 (2014). 
17  See Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through 
Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501 
(2009). 
18  See Johnson, supra note 14. 
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markets, repayable over periods of up to twenty years.
19
  Between 2006 and 
2014, IFFIm issued bonds in five different markets and raised USD 5 
billion.
20
  An evaluation of IFFIm’s impact estimated that by 2011, these 
investments averted between 1.3 million and 2.08 million deaths.
21 
The International Finance Facility (“IFF”) was an idea that was 
initially championed by Gordon Brown of the United Kingdom (then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer) as a hybrid approach to combining both public 
and private sources of development finance.  Inspired by the UN Millennium 
Summit of 2000, Brown put forward the idea of a large-scale IFF for 
achieving the MDGs.
22
  By November 2004, the United Kingdom and 
France announced their shared commitment to launch a smaller scale version 
of the IFF focused on immunizations in partnership with the Global Alliance 
for Vaccines and Immunizations (“GAVI”).
23 
At the 2005 World Summit, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, 
and Sweden committed nearly USD 4 billion to scale-up the work of GAVI 
through the IFFIm.  Along with the founding donors, ten countries have so 
far contributed to IFFIm, including Norway, Brazil, South Africa, and Japan.  
However, the United Kingdom and France account for nearly three quarters 
of the total amount pledged by donors to IFFIm.
24
   
 IFFIm quickly transformed the capacity of GAVI with the initial USD 
1.2 billion raised, which allowed its vaccination programs to expand rapidly.  
Since its inception in 2006, IFFIm has raised USD 5 billion and provided the 
majority of overall financing to GAVI.
25
  Although IFFIm provides a net 
increase in funding in the short-to-medium term for GAVI, its approach 
means that the cost of servicing IFFIm bonds is currently greater than the 
resources that IFFIm generates for GAVI, and this negative balance will 
increase over the next decade.
26
   
IFFIm operates as a charitable company based within the United 
Kingdom, with a board consisting of seven individuals with strong 
experience either in the finance industry or in financial regulation.  Although 
                                                     
19 Origins of IFFIm, IFFIM, http://www.iffim.org/about/origins-of-iffim/ (last visited May 16, 2015). 
20 Donors, IFFIM, http://www.iffim.org/donors/ (last visited May 16, 2015). 
21  MARK PEARSON ET AL., HEALTH & LIFE SCIENCES PARTNERSHIP, EVALUATION OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL FACILITY FOR IMMUNISATION 26 (2011).  
22 See Todd Moss, Ten Myths of the International Finance Facility 3 (Ctr. for Global Development 
Working Paper No. 60, 2005). 
23  Origins of IFFIm, IFFIM, http://www.iffim.org/about/origins-of-iffim/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2015). 
24  Donor Profiles - United Kingdom, GAVI, http://www.gavi.org/funding/donor-profiles/united-
kingdom/ (last visited May 15, 2015); Donor Profiles - France, GAVI, http://www.gavi.org/funding/donor-
profiles/france/ (last visited May 15, 2015). 
25  Donors, supra note 20. 
26  See U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Economic Report and Social Survey: 
In Search of New Development Finance, U.N. Doc. E/2012/50/Rev. 1 (2012). 
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several of these board members have some background in either health or 
development, the relevant expertise of each is primarily in the finance arena.  
The board reviews funding requests by the GAVI immunization program, 
oversees IFFIm’s governance and policies, and monitors its investment 
portfolio and efficacy.
27
  In contrast, the board of GAVI includes donor 
country governments, recipient country governments, foundation 
representatives, industry representatives, NGO representatives, and select 
individuals.
28
  While the IFFIm board periodically updates the GAVI 
secretariat, the GAVI board does not have any formal oversight authority 
over IFFIm.
29 
IFFIm’s success in resource mobilization was closely tied to the AAA 
credit rating of its bonds at the time of issue.  The AAA rating of IFFIm 
reflected the fact that governments that were rated AAA accounted for nearly 
85 percent of IFFIm donor commitments, and the World Bank was selected 
as the treasurer of the funds.  The overall level of front-loading was limited 
by the management agreement with the World Bank, which required IFFIm 
to maintain at least 30 percent of its resources as a financial cushion.
30
  Since 
the 2008 financial crisis, leading IFFIm donors such as France, Spain, Italy, 
and the United Kingdom have lost their AAA rating, which has in turn 
influenced the credit rating of IFFIm.  In 2013, Moody’s Investors Services 
downgraded IFFIm to Aa1 with a negative outlook, and other rating firms 
have also downgraded the credit rating of IFFIm since the initial offerings.
31
  
A recent evaluation of IFFIm, five years after its launch, found it 
relatively successful in accelerating the flow of global health resources, but 
less successful in influencing the market for vaccines.
32
  In terms of resource 
mobilization, grant commitments by donors of USD 6.2 billion in legally 
binding pledges should enable IFFIm to disburse USD 4.3 billion by 2026.  
The low borrowing costs of IFFIm have exceeded initial expectations.  
While this innovative mechanism allowed for the front-loading of resources 
at relatively low borrowing rates, nearly a third of the committed resources 
will service the debt generated under this approach.  Although IFFIm has 
paid the significant start-up costs required to gain access to funding on the 
                                                     
27  IFFIm Governance, IFFIM, http://www.iffim.org/about/governance/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2015). 
28  GAVI Board, GAVI, http://www.gavialliance.org/about/governance/gavi-board/ (last visited Apr. 
28, 2015). 
29  PEARSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 64-65 
30  Id. 
31  Press Release, IFFIm, IFFIm Rating Action by Moody’s Follows UK Downgrade (Mar. 6, 2013), 
http://www.iffim.org/library/news/press-releases/2013/iffim-rating-action-by-moodys-follows-uk-
downgrade/. 
32  See PEARSON ET AL., supra note 21. 
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financial markets, it does not yet have enough financing to fully take 
advantage of those markets.
33
   
 Expanding vaccine coverage can be a cost-effective intervention, 
because significant positive externalities come from the herd immunity that 
results from vaccinating a threshold percentage of a given population.
34
  In 
terms of the vaccine market, accelerating demand has contributed to the 
maturity of the market, but IFFIm has not catalyzed a transformation of the 
market.  It is clear that IFFIm expanded the size of the pentavelent vaccine 
market, and thereby contributed to price reductions, but it is less clear that 
any broader market impact flowed from the substantial resources of IFFIm.  
While IFFIm’s founding documents did not specifically reference any 
objective with regard to shaping the the market for vaccines, this dimension 
proved to be an important feature of other innovative finance mechanisms 
and was a key goal of IFFIm’s implementing partner GAVI.
35 
Although IFFIm demonstrated the potential for a larger-scale IFF, the 
conditions that enabled IFFIm to secure relatively low costs of borrowing 
based on the strong credit rating of its core donors have not proven 
sustainable.  The leadership of the United Kingdom was essential to the 
creation of IFFIm but the lack of participation by the United States and other 
major donors ultimately limited its scale.  The World Bank’s role, while 
important in fostering financial credibility for the new enterprise, 
constrained the degree of front-loading of the overall resources.36   Among 
the keys to IFFIm’s success were the strong commitment by the UK, the 
rigorous design process, the credibility of the partnership with the World 
Bank, and the strong rating of IFFIm’s bonds.
37 
B. UNITAID 
 
The roots of UNITAID can be found in the 2000 Millennium Summit 
establishing the MDGs and the 2002 Monterrey Summit on development 
financing to achieve the MDGs.  At the 2002 Monterrey Summit, French 
President Jacques Chirac asked his fellow heads of state to seriously 
consider a financial transaction tax as a mechanism to generate resources for 
development, but this idea received relatively little support at the time.  In 
                                                     
33  Id. at 30-31. 
34  See TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL COLLECTIVE ACTION 105 (2004). 
35 IFFIm Board Response to the IFFIm Evaluaion (June 1, 2011), http://www.iffim.org/Library/ 
Documents/Evaluations /IFFIm-evaluation--IFFIm-Board-response/. 
36  World Bank Response to IFFIm Evaluation (July 1, 2011), http://www.iffim.org/Library/Document
s/Evaluations/IFFIm-evaluation--The-World-Bank-response/ (arguing that the retention of a financial 
cushion is a core element of the financial credibility of IFFIm). 
37  See PEARSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 33. 
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November 2003, Chirac tasked Jean-Pierre Landau, a long-time French civil 
servant, with formally investigating a range of options with respect to 
innovative financing.  By March 2004, Chirac and his top advisors reflected 
on the recommendations of the Landau report and settled on an airline ticket 
tax as the best approach.
38
  They determined that such a mechanism would 
be easy to implement, target those with greater discretionary income, and 
serve as a symbol of globalization while imposing limited burdens on the air 
travel market.  Over the next year, Chirac and the President of Brazil, Lula 
Da Silva, became the leading champions for the imposition of an airline tax 
to help achieve the MDGs.
39 
The impetus for UNITAID’s focus on the market for drugs for AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria came from the French Foreign Minister Philippe 
Douste-Blazy.  After his appointment in 2005, Douste-Blazy sought advice 
from former United States President Bill Clinton about the focus of the 
effort.  Clinton’s suggestion was to focus on leveraging lower prices for 
drugs for AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis through negotiation and volume 
discounts.
40
  Subsequently, Chirac and Lula agreed to create UNITAID as an 
international facility for drug purchases, and the United Kingdom joined in 
exchange for some of the resources of the French airline tax being used to 
support IFFIm.
41
   
UNITAID was designed to collaborate with other leading global 
health institutions, including the World Health Organization, the Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, and the Clinton 
Foundation.
42
   The exact details of the implementation of the airline ticket 
tax vary from country to country.  In France, the tax is one euro for domestic 
flights and six euros for international flights in economy class, and ten and 
forty euros, respectively, in first class.
43
  UNITAID is innovative in its 
governance and use of funds as well as its approach to generating resources.  
The UNITAID Executive Board consists of twelve members, including the 
six leading donor country governments, government representatives from 
Asia and Africa, civil society representatives from the global North and 
South, a foundation representative, and a representative from the World 
                                                     
38  Interview with President Jacques Chirac About UNITAID, UNITAID, http://www.unitaid.eu/en 
/rss-unitaid/1257-interview-with-president-jacques-chirac-about-unitaid (last visited May 16, 2015). 
39  PHILIPPE DOUSTE-BLAZY & DANIEL ALTMAN, POWER IN NUMBERS: UNITAID, INNOVATIVE 
FINANCING, AND THE QUEST FOR MASSIVE GOOD 23 (2010). 
40  Id. at 21-22. 
41  Id. at 28-29. 
42  Id. at 24. 
43  Press Release, French Levy on Airline Tickets Raises More than One Billion Euros for World’s 
Poor Since 2006 (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.unitaid.eu/en/resources/press-centre/releases/1125-french-
levy-on-airline-tickets-raises-more-than-one-billion-euros-for-world-s-poor-since-2006. 
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Health Organization.
44
  The governance of UNITAID reflects a larger role 
for diverse stakeholders from the affected populations and countries than in 
most innovative financing mechanisms.   
The scale of investments by UNITAID opened up space for 
negotiating prices with pharmaceutical companies across a range of diseases.  
One example of market innovation is the Affordable Medicines Facility, 
which pays bulk subsidies to the manufacturers of antimalarials in order to 
facilitate low-cost purchases by consumers in low-income countries.  
Through this facility, UNITAID has successfully helped bring down the cost 
of leading malaria treatments, such as artemisinin.
45
  UNITAID also 
contributed to developing new pediatric anti-retroviral formulations for HIV, 
new pediatric tuberculosis treatments, and to significantly lowering prices 
for drugs against HIV/AIDS and multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis. 46   
UNITAID is distinctive among most major innovative financing 
mechanisms in that it does not rely on donor governments to either directly 
supply or guarantee its resource flow.
47
  
The role of UNITAID in re-shaping the market for drugs reflects the 
innovative nature of its governance structure.  In the view of Douste-Blazy, 
the balanced representation of both donors and affected populations has been 
a crucial feature.
48
  More specifically, he cites the involvement of NGO 
representatives who were unwilling to accept anything less than an approach 
designed around the potential for significant market impact as critical to the 
ultimate success of UNITAID: “Like Bill Clinton, [Northern NGO 
representative] Elouardighi was convinced that UNITAID had to be 
innovative in its spending as well as its fund-raising . . . [and declared that] 
‘we set up UNITAID to have a market impact on drugs. . . . As a board 
member, I am going to refuse all the programs without market impact.’”
49
  
 UNITAID has been successful, both in resource mobilization and in 
its strategy of limited but leveraged market interventions.  By 2011, nine 
countries had imposed some form of tax on air tickets to support UNITAID. 
This mechanism accounted for approximately 61 percent of total UNITAID 
                                                     
44  Executive Board, UNITAID, http://www.unitaid.eu/governance-mainmenu-4/executive-board-
mainmenu-33?task=view&id=35 (last visited Apr. 26, 2015). 
45  See generally Suerie Moon et al., Focusing on Quality Patient Care in the New Global Subsidy for 
Malaria Medicines, 6 PLOS MED (2009), available at http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id= 
10.1371/journal.pmed.1000106#s1. 
46  DOUSTE-BLAZY & ALTMAN, supra note 39, at 121. 
47 Id. at 45.   
48 Id. at 115. 
49  Id. at 37-38. 
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resources and generated USD 1.48 billion for UNITAID.
50
  An evaluation of 
UNITAD, five years later, validated UNITAID’s approach of engaging in 
limited interventions with significant market impact in key markets for 
essential medicines.  The evaluation found that: “UNITAID has been doing 
the right things to contribute to significant positive outcomes in the fight 
against the three diseases . . . . UNITAID has validated its business model of 
identifying, selecting, and funding market-shaping interventions carried out 
by implementing partners.” 
51
  UNITAID’s substantial contribution reflects 
not only the leadership of the French government, but also important early 
strategic decisions during the design stage of the initiative, including the 
incorporation of diverse stakeholders in its governance structure. 
C. Advanced Market Commitment 
 
The genesis of the Advanced Market Commitment (“AMC”) began 
with the work of economist Michael Kremer of Harvard University.
52
   
Kremer and his co-authors wrote about the potential for long-term contracts 
financed by donors to create incentives for the research and development 
needed to develop vaccines for low-income countries. 53   Seeking to 
demonstrate leadership on development, the Italian government 
commissioned the Tremonti Report analyzing the concept of the AMC in 
2005.
54
  The report raised the level of interest among other nations, and the 
G8 ultimately agreed to explore the feasibility of the idea.  The first 
technical meeting of the AMC took place in Rome in 2006, and a pilot 
project focused on the pneumococcal vaccine was soon agreed upon. 
Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Russia, and the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation formally launched the AMC in February 2007.  
The donors committed to provide USD 1.5 billion in order to guarantee a 
market for the pneumococcal vaccine in low-income countries.55  The choice 
of the pneumococcal vaccine was based on the existence of a vaccine in an 
advanced stage of production that could demonstrate results quickly, as well 
                                                     
50 About UNITAID, UNITAID, http://www.unitaid.eu/en/who/about-unitaid (last visited May 15, 
2015).  
51  See UNITAID, 5-YEAR EVALUATION SUMMARY 1 (2012). 
52  See Ernst R. Berndt et al., Advanced Market Commitments for Vaccines Against Neglected 
Diseases: Estimating Costs and Effectiveness, 16 HEALTH ECON. 491 (2007). 
53  See id.  
54  See Minister of the Economy and Finance (Italy), Report to the G8 Finance Ministers, Advanced 
Market Commitments for Vaccines: A New Tool in the Fight Against Disease and Poverty (Dec. 2, 2005), 
http://www.innovativefinanceoslo.no/pop.cfm?FuseAction=Doc&p%20Action=View&pDocumentId=1152
9. 
55  Donald W. Light, Advanced Market Commitments: Current Realities and Alternate Approaches, 
HAI EUROPE/MEDICO INTERNATIONAL PAPER SERIES, ref. no. 03-2009/01, 2009, at 2. 
JUNE 2015 INNOVATIVE FINANCING 505 
 
as the fact that it is one of the largest vaccine preventable killers of children 
under five.  Before the AMC, the pneumococcal vaccine was essentially a 
product for developed nations, which did not necessarily cover the strains of 
the disease that were most prevalent in low-income countries.   However, the 
architects of the AMC did not clearly establish the relative priority of the 
longer-term market incentive role of the mechanisms versus the near-term 
capacity to implement a successful global health initiative.  The seven week 
timeline for the selection of a target disease for the AMC very likely pushed 
the process toward the selection of a late-stage vaccine for which better 
quality data was available.
56
  The expert committee, despite strong 
representation from developing country governments, was largely limited to 
health officials with less of a background or focus on the market 
transforming potential of the AMC.
57 
  In May 2007, the AMC Donor Committee, consisting of the founding 
donors, created an independent Economic Expert Group.
58
  The Economic 
Expert Group consisted largely of academic economists to devise options for 
implementing the model.  AMC’s ultimate design provided that each 
manufacturer would receive a share of the committed financing in 
proportion to its supply commitment.  Two leading pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, Pfizer and GlaxoSmithKline, agreed to supply 60 million 
doses over ten years.  The advanced contract provided that the first 20 
percent of each manufacturer’s supply would be priced at USD 7 per dose, 
while the remaining 80 percent would be priced at USD 3.50 per dose.  
Based on the recommendations of the GAVI Expert Economic Group, the 
pricing level was intended to ensure a commercially viable market and to 
foster greater competition.
59
  The costs were designed to be shared between 
GAVI, which received the AMC funding, and recipient countries on a per 
capita basis.  While the legally binding commitments on donor pledges were 
important to building confidence among manufacturers, these legal 
guarantees remained relatively weak and did not come close to covering all 
of the resources needed to fully implement the AMC.
60 
The AMC had significant long-term financial repercussions for GAVI.  
In order to cover the cost of the AMC, GAVI needed to raise more overall 
resources than were ultimately contributed by the donors that launched the 
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AMC.
61
  Critics such as Oxfam argue that the vaccines targeted by the AMC 
could have been acquired more cheaply through existing UNICEF 
procedures to purchase vaccines for developing countries.
62
  Nonetheless, 
the Chair of GAVI’s board explained that “GAVI would stick to its 
commitments under the AMC deal, but would in the future look at ways of 
getting better value.”
63
       
Although originally viewed as a mechanism to incentivize the 
development of new vaccines, the market impact of the AMC is more 
difficult to assess given the fact that the pneumococcal vaccine was already 
in existence before the launch of the initiative.  The AMC targeting 
pneumococcal did catalyze a significant price reduction from the price 
established for developed countries for the vaccine.  However, given that the 
research and development costs of vaccine manufacturers would already be 
recouped in the developed country market, the current AMC seems closer to 
a surplus contract than a research incentive scheme.   
While the AMC accelerated the uptake of the pneumococcal vaccine 
in low-income countries, it remains less clear whether the AMC was 
necessary to catalyze pharmaceutical firms to enter this market in the first 
place.
64
  According to an independent evaluation of the AMC, one major 
pharmaceutical manufacturer was planning to establish a large-scale plant in 
Singapore to produce the vaccine for low-income countries even before the 
announcement of the initiative.  However, other firms seem to have decided 
to enter this marketplace only after the AMC announcement.
65
  One recent 
study of innovative financing suggests that: “It is impossible to know if the 
opportunity to provide the vaccines to millions of people . . . would have 
been enough to entice low cost manufacturers to participate without the 
advance guarantee that vaccine would be purchased.”
66 
While the counterfactual is difficult to analyze, the experience of 
GAVI’s efforts with other vaccines suggests that the AMC may not have 
been essential to achieving this outcome.  For example, the market for 
pentavalent vaccine became relatively competitive, with six manufacturers 
building research programs and gaining pre-qualification from the World 
Health Organization, without any advanced purchase commitments.  
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However, these vaccine purchases were backed by the resource guarantees 
of IFFIm, and the pentavalent vaccine is simpler to manufacture and requires 
a smaller initial investment than the PCV vaccine.
67
  Nonetheless, it seems 
quite plausible that at least some of the efficiencies in terms of pricing and 
the predictability of expanded manufacturing capacity could have been 
achieved without the long-term commitments of the AMC, which locked-in 
pricing and limited the future bargaining power of GAVI with leading 
manufacturers. 
III. EXPLAINING THE EVOLUTION AND IMPACT OF INNOVATIVE FINANCING 
 
UNITAID, IFFIm, and the AMC share a common catalyst, but each 
evolved in quite different ways that reflect the important role of path 
dependence in shaping innovative financing for development.  The 
expansion of innovative financing for global health over the last decade 
reflects the influence of the MDGs and the incentives for donor countries to 
achieve these goals through innovative financing mechanisms.  Even as 
formal United Nations processes drove much of the MDG agenda, G8 
countries proved to be among the most important champions for launching 
innovative finance mechanisms for global health.  Ultimately, the specific 
architecture of each mechanism depended a great deal on the range of state 
and non-state actors who participated in the process of design and 
governance.   
In the wake of the 2005 Gleneagles commitments by the G8 to 
increase development financing, there was significant additional pressure on 
national governments to identify alternative approaches to meet these 
commitments.
68
  Although France and the United Kingdom were the 
competitive actors in promoting innovative finance mechanisms, both 
countries ultimately realized that their initiatives were much less likely to 
succeed without the participation of the other.  While strong incentives 
existed for individual G8 governments to get credit for promoting specific 
innovative finance mechanisms, each national champion sought the 
legitimacy of formal G8 endorsement and the participation of a range of 
non-G8 governments in order to demonstrate broad international support.69 
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Although these three innovative finance mechanisms share common 
roots, their specific approaches reflected the different national champions of 
each mechanism.  The Landau report on innovative financing options 
commissioned by French President Jacques Chirac highlighted taxation 
mechanisms as among the most viable approaches.  Both Chirac and his 
successor, Nicolas Sarkozy, shared a strong interest in implementing a 
broader financial transactions tax to support development financing.  Chirac 
and his advisors quickly settled on the more modest airline ticket tax as a 
mechanism that would be consistent with these broader global taxation 
ambitions, while also having a limited impact on the national budget.  By 
contrast, the United Kingdom, which spearheaded the Gleneagles 
commitments on development assistance and is home to a leading financial 
center, was more willing to expand its domestic budget investments in 
development financing, more eager to leverage private market financing, and 
more reluctant to support new forms of taxation.  Meanwhile, Italy, with 
much more limited resources devoted to traditional development assistance, 
sought to promote a model that had already gained currency among some 
leading development economists and held the potential for a leveraged 
impact from finite donor financing over a relatively long time period. 
These three national champions continue to be the leading financial 
supporters of each of these innovative financing mechanisms.  IFFIm is now 
on track to generate USD 6.3 billion in resources by 2030.
70
  UNITAID has 
already raised USD 2.2 billion, of which over USD 1.4 billion was generated 
through the airline levy.
71
  With UNITAID, France alone has raised over 
USD 1.2 billion, Spain has raised USD 81 million, and Brazil has raised 
USD 37 million.
72
  The AMC catalyzed donor commitments of USD 1.5 
billion and has so far led to actual contributions of just under USD 1 billion 
and disbursements of over USD 850 million.
73
  With the AMC, Italy 
committed USD 685 million, while the United Kingdom committed USD 
485 million, Canada committed USD 200 billion, and all other donors 
committed less than USD 100 million.
74 
The specific architecture and design of each mechanism depended a 
great deal on the range of stakeholders that participated in the design process 
and the governance structure.  The French ultimately embraced a multi-
stakeholder governance model for UNITAID, including diverse civil society 
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actors and developing country governments; the board of IFFIm consists of 
finance experts; and the design of the AMC was shaped by its major donors 
and select groups of experts.  Both the IFFIm and the AMC, in selecting 
GAVI as the core partner for implementation, had some links to a multi-
stakeholder governance structure.  Yet, in contrast with the UNITAID 
governance model, GAVI’s board involves non-state actors as independent 
individuals even as it has representatives from the vaccine industry, research 
institutes, foundations, and NGOs.
75 
While the rise of innovative financing over the last decade reflects a 
broader shift in norms tied to the launch of the Millennium Development 
Goals, the evolution of each specific mechanism reveals the important role 
of state sponsors and non-state actors.  The innovative financing model in 
the context of global health strongly reflected the initial visions of founding 
governments, and these early decisions continued to shape the evolution of 
these institutions over time.  While states remain the central actors in 
catalyzing the launch of innovative financing mechanisms, non-state actors 
are no less important in influencing the ultimate trajectory of these 
initiatives.   
While UNITAID includes affected populations in its governance 
structure, IFFIm and the AMC rely much more heavily on experts to shape 
the strategic direction of the initiatives.  With IFFIm, expertise within the 
finance industry was central to its design and implementation; with the 
AMC, experts in health and economics were each given important roles at 
different stages.   These different models have important implications for the 
ultimate impact of each mechanism in terms of market impact.    
In the case of UNITAID, the involvement of affected groups and other 
non-state actors significantly influenced the focus of the initiative on 
shaping the market for essential medicines.
76
  Although officials within the 
French government shaped the adoption of a tax on airline tickets as the 
central financing mechanism, non-state actors strongly influenced the 
innovative approach to the pharmaceutical market.  Initial conversations 
with the leadership of the Clinton Foundation suggested focusing on 
medicines for AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, and the persistent role of 
civil society board members contributed to UNITAID’s consistent focus on 
its ultimate market impact across these three diseases.
77
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By contrast, the finance officials on the IFFIm board proved to be 
ingenious at identifying low bond spreads in the Japanese markets but were 
much less interested in the ways in which front-loaded financing might re-
shape vaccine markets.  The AMC is a somewhat confusing case since the 
initial premise was to create powerful incentives for research and 
development for new vaccines but the pressures of G8 decision-making led 
to a focus on a vaccine that already existed.
78
  As a result, the AMC had a 
much more limited impact on re-shaping vaccine markets than originally 
anticipated, and the potential of the original idea of incentivizing vaccine 
development remains largely untested. 
The three innovative financing mechanisms also have profoundly 
different financial implications in the medium to long run.  The airline ticket 
tax, which UNITAID utilized, appears to be the most sustainable of the three 
financing mechanisms because it relies on a relatively steady stream of 
individual consumer transactions.  However, this approach is not necessarily 
as predictable as some of the other mechanisms since it depends on a 
potentially fluctuating level of air travel.  By contrast, IFFIm is proving to be 
the most predictable of these innovative financing mechanisms but it is far 
from sustainable.  In fact, the front-loading of IFFIm has already peaked, 
and the debt servicing on IFFIm bonds will outweigh the resources it 
generates for GAVI over the decade to come.
79
  In addition, the unique 
conditions, which enabled IFFIm to succeed on the bond markets, are no 
longer present.  Amidst weakening bond ratings for both IFFIm and key 
donor governments, this model does not appear to be quite as sustainable in 
periods of heightened economic uncertainty.  Finally, the AMC seems to be 
quite predictable in specifying advanced contracts with vaccine 
manufacturers, but this very predictability is becoming a significant financial 
liability for GAVI.  The initial donor contributions, which catalyzed the 
AMC, fell far short of the overall costs of the arrangement.
80
  Although a 
lower price for the vaccines might be possible today, the lock-in effect of the 
advanced contract is a significant downside for GAVI as prices continue to 
decline.
81 
The most successful of these innovative financing mechanisms seem 
to be the most automatic and the most participatory.  The airline ticket tax, 
once implemented, does not depend on the future actions of national 
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governments to generate resources.  By contrast, even the binding 
commitments involved in IFFIm and the AMC ultimately require national 
governments to fulfill their commitments.  More participatory approaches to 
designing and governing innovative financing seem to foster better outcomes 
in terms of the market impact of these financing mechanisms.  The expert-
led model of the AMC design did not achieve the level of market impact of 
the multi-stakeholder model utilized by UNITAID.  While there are certainly 
other important differences in the underlying mechanisms that contributed to 
this result, there is evidence that the participation by affected groups was 
important in shaping the ultimate market impact of UNITAID.  Table 1 
highlights the diverse models of innovative financing and governance of 
each of these mechanisms.  Additionally, it highlights the impact of each in 
terms of the predictability and sustainability of financing, as well as in terms 
of ultimate market impact: 
 
Table 1 
MECHANISM IFFIm (2006) UNITAID (2006) AMC (2007) 
MODEL Bond Tax Contract 
GOVERNANCE Expert Multi-Stakeholder Expert 
FINANCING Predictable  Sustainable  Predictable 
MARKET IMPACT Medium High Low 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCING THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
GOALS 
 
As negotiation of the final Sustainable Development Goals is 
accelerating, the challenge of financing these ambitious goals is catalyzing 
renewed interest in a range of innovative financing mechanisms.  A High 
Level Task Force on Innovative Financing for Health, including World Bank 
President Robert Zoellick and Gordon Brown, issued recommendations for 
expanding existing financing mechanisms.  The report called for the 
expansion of UNITAID and IFFIm, the extension of the airline ticket tax to 
more countries, the possible expansion of the mandate of IFFIm, and further 
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investigation into the viability of levies on tobacco and currency transactions.  
Amidst declining donor commitments to overseas development assistance 
(“ODA”), some commentators have cynically viewed these latest efforts as a 
response by governments failing to meet their ODA obligations. 82  
Nonetheless, as national budgets continue to tighten, innovative approaches 
are generating greater interest.83   Lessons from the experience of global 
health financing over the last decade can contribute to a better assessment of 
these recent proposals and offer some guidance on the direction of 
innovative financing for development. 
Among the most important features of these innovative financing 
mechanisms are the sustainability of financing and the breadth of 
participation in the governance of these initiatives.  While the challenge of 
achieving the MDGs has highlighted the significance of ensuring both 
predictable and sustainable development financing, innovative financing 
mechanisms that promise sustainable approaches are likely to be more 
effective in the long run.  Predictability can take many forms and can 
sometimes pose a constraint on innovation and learning.  The predictability 
of accelerated financing under IFFIm came with a long tail of debt financing, 
which will limit GAVI’s ability to incorporate lessons from its initial 
implementation efforts.  Similarly, the predictability of advanced contracting 
under the AMC limits the potential for capturing the savings from 
accelerating declines in drug pricing over time. 
Amidst growing donor fatigue in the wake of the financial crisis, the 
sustainability of development financing will be even more crucial over the 
next decade.  Although the revenue generated from the airline ticket tax can 
fluctuate in relation to the economy, the automatic nature of the mechanism 
and its relative independence from the annual budget process of donor 
countries ensure greater sustainability.  Automatic mechanisms that do not 
rely on domestic cross-pressures and fragile donor commitments are likely 
to become even more important to future efforts at development financing. 
No less important than the sustainability of innovative financing 
mechanisms is the structure of governance of these initiatives.  Based on 
these three mechanisms, the more participatory models seem to demonstrate 
more promising market impact than the less participatory models, which rely 
more heavily on expertise and offer more limited roles for affected 
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populations.  The NGO representatives on UNITAID’s board proved to be 
forceful and effective advocates for the institution becoming an aggressive 
player in reshaping the markets for medicines.  The less participatory 
approaches to governance within IFFIm and the AMC contributed to a more 
limited focus on the potential long-term market impact of these mechanisms.  
It is quite possible that a more participatory design process might have led 
the AMC to focus on spurring the development of an earlier stage vaccine of 
the type that the mechanism was originally designed to incentivize. 
Applying these insights from the experience of innovative financing 
for health suggests that a broader bond-financed IFF for development 
financing may prove challenging.  A broader IFF faces major obstacles 
because the leading governments behind IFFIm no longer hold the stellar 
credit ratings that they once did, so the cost of borrowing could be much 
greater.  In addition, the potential benefits of accelerated financing under a 
broader IFF would still not address the lack of sustainability in this model of 
innovative development financing.  However, the IFF is but one model of 
bond financing.  More decentralized approaches, including supporting 
municipal bond offerings, may prove more attractive in the context of 
financing the SDGs. 
At least as important as the overall model of financing is the approach 
to the design and governance of innovative mechanisms and the extent to 
which diverse stakeholders are involved.  The more participatory 
governance structure of UNITAID contributed to its success in reshaping the 
market of medicines for AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.  UNITAID 
contributed to the development of new pediatric anti-retroviral formulations 
and tuberculosis treatments, to dramatic price cuts in the cost of medicines 
for AIDS and tuberculosis, and to greater efficiencies in the supply of anti-
malaria medicines.84  By contrast, IFFIm had a much smaller impact on the 
vaccine market relative to its overall resources, and the AMC fell short of its 
potential to catalyze the development of important new vaccines. 
The apparent relationship between participation and the success of 
innovative financing mechanisms is consistent with research on recently 
created vertical funds in the area of development financing.  More 
independent, more participatory, and more performance-based vertical funds 
are outperforming the less independent, less participatory, and less 
performance-based vertical funds on the dimensions of resource 
mobilization, learning, and impact.  Less-independent institutions are less 
likely to involve non-state actors in governance and participation seems to 
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play an important role in shaping resource mobilization and effective 
implementation at the country level. 85 
The significance of participation for innovative financing also extends 
to the feedback mechanisms and potential for learning within this new 
generation of institutions.  Recent studies highlight the ways in which 
openness to the participation of diverse stakeholders can contribute to 
furthering deliberation in the process of institutional decision-making.  
Involving civil society actors in the process of agenda setting is an important 
feature of this pattern within international institutions, but no less important 
are the mechanisms for continuous feedback, the involvement of local 
contextual knowledge in implementation, and peer review.86  Despite the 
requirement of independent five-year evaluations for each of the three 
innovative finance mechanisms examined, there are not yet the type of 
continuous feedback mechanisms that would contribute to institutional 
learning. 
Expanded participation within innovative financing mechanisms also 
responds to concerns about the overall accountability of development 
financing institutions. 87   Scholars examining the accountability of 
international institutions have identified “hybrid intergovernmental-private 
administration” as an increasingly important form of global administration in 
which non-governmental actors participate alongside government 
representatives in standard-setting.88   With the growing role of non-state 
actors in the governance of development financing and international 
institutions more generally, identifying the mechanisms which foster greater 
accountability within the context of multi-stakeholder governance will be 
increasingly important to the future of development financing.89 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 The growth of innovative financing for development over the last 
decade has demonstrated the enormous potential of new mechanisms for 
generating resources beyond traditional official development assistance.  In 
the global health sector, diverse approaches to innovative finance among 
different institutions provide a window into the relative merits of approaches 
that rely on taxation, bonds, and advanced contract arrangements.  The 
experience of IFFIm, UNITAID, and the AMC offer broader insights into 
the importance of sustainability and participation in ensuring the success of 
innovative finance mechanisms and the potential for innovative financing to 
contribute to realizing the SDGs.  
 Although none of these innovative approaches would have been 
established without the catalyst of the Millennium Development Goals and 
the leading role of members of the G8, the ultimate direction and success of 
each reflected the diversity of the non-state actors involved in the process 
and the level of independence of these financing mechanism from reliance 
upon traditional donor financing commitments.  Greater sustainability is 
easier to achieve with automatic mechanisms that generate resources 
regardless of whether donors fulfil their financing commitments.  Greater 
market impact appears to be more likely when affected populations are 
included in the design and governance of innovative financing mechanisms. 
 Further research is needed to better assess how well these lessons 
from first generation innovative financing efforts translate into the diverse 
types of investments required to achieve the SDGs.  While it is plausible that 
sustainability and participation will remain important variables in the 
success of innovative financing, the relative importance of these dimensions 
may well be contingent on the capacities and the incentives of the state and 
non-state actors involved in a given sector.  As resources are often fungible, 
new approaches to innovative financing in support of the Sustainable 
Development Goals will face the twin challenges of ensuring that new 
resources are, in fact, additional amidst tightening donor funding, and 
maintaining a sustainable development focus when the very success of these 
financing models invites significant competition over scarce resources. 
